In the past two decades, Israel has moved toward a form of warfare that attempts to remove the battle from the war, in which Israel has opted to keep its soldiers and army at a distance while relying on its potent airpower as a means of offensive action. It has employed this strategy during its past wars in Gaza with the effect of preserving the lives of its soldiers while killing hundreds of Palestinians, mostly civilians. In 2021, Israel actually tried to deceive Palestinian fighters by announcing a ground operation, aiming to target underground tunnels and eliminate numerous Palestinian fighters. The so-called “metro operation” failed partially due to Palestinian disbelief that Israel would actually enter the Gaza Strip. For years, the reliance on airpower alongside intelligence turned Israel into a one-dimensional army that uses air control for counterinsurgency operations, with all its operational limitations and limited efficacy in targeting fighters, while wreaking havoc in Palestinian civilian spaces.
Israel has chosen a mode of killing without the peril of being killed. This strategy has spurred its adversaries to develop alternatives in response to Israel’s apparent reluctance for ground engagements — if you won’t come to us, we’ll come to you. War, as Clausewitz suggests, is inherently dialectical, akin to a “duel” in which each side employs technical expertise, determination, organizational structure, command and control, and intelligence to secure an upper hand. This is what happened on October 7; it was a Palestinian response to the tactical status quo that Israel had imposed.
It is crucial to understand that Palestinian resistance in the Gaza Strip initiated the planning for this operation in 2022, merely a year after Israel’s “metro operation” failed to achieve its intended outcomes. Palestinian military planners took into account several significant factors in their planning. One of them was Israel’s recurrent reluctance to engage directly in Gaza, but there were also political and social pressures that pushed in the direction of October 7. They included the sluggish and limited improvements in living conditions on the strip and the absence of a clear political path forward. In other words, it was the exhaustion of political, diplomatic, and legal avenues.Abdaljawad Omar, Hopeful pathologies in the war for Palestine: a reply to Adam Shatz
(via edwordsmyth)




























